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Preschool childrenExact integer concepts are fundamental to a wide array of human
activities, but their origins are obscure. Some have proposed that
children are endowed with a system of natural number concepts,
whereas others have argued that children construct these concepts
by mastering verbal counting or other numeric symbols. This
debate remains unresolved, because it is difﬁcult to test children’s
mastery of the logic of integer concepts without using symbols to
enumerate large sets, and the symbols themselves could be a
source of difﬁculty for children. Here, we introduce a new method,
focusing on large quantities and avoiding the use of words or other
symbols for numbers, to study children’s understanding of an
essential property underlying integer concepts: the relation of
exact numerical equality. Children aged 32–36 months, who pos-
sessed no symbols for exact numbers beyond 4, were given one-
to-one correspondence cues to help them track a set of puppets,
and their enumeration of the set was assessed by a non-verbal
manual search task. Children used one-to-one correspondence
relations to reconstruct exact quantities in sets of 5 or 6 objects,
as long as the elements forming the sets remained the same indi-
viduals. In contrast, they failed to track exact quantities when
one element was added, removed, or substituted for another. These
results suggest an alternative to both nativist and symbol-based
constructivist theories of the development of natural number con-é, 45 rue
28 V. Izard et al. / Cognitive Psychology 72 (2014) 27–53cepts: Before learning symbols for exact numbers, children have a
partial understanding of the properties of exact numbers.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
Number is one of the core competences of the human mind (Carey, 2009; Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene
& Brannon, 2011). From birth, human infants discriminate between sets on the basis of number
(Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Izard, Sann, Spelke, & Streri, 2009; Xu & Spelke, 2000), and by
the ﬁrst few months of life, they can perform simple numerical additions, subtractions, and compar-
isons (Brannon & Van de Walle, 2001; McCrink & Wynn, 2004, 2007; Wynn, 1992). To account for
these competences, current theories grant infants two core systems capable of encoding numerical
information (Carey, 2009; Feigenson et al., 2004; Hyde, 2011). These two systems are associated with
infants’ numerical capacities with large and small sets, respectively. First, infants can represent,
compare, and perform arithmetic operations on large approximate numerosities. Second, infants
can track small sets of up to 3 or 4 objects, and through these attentional abilities, they can solve
simple arithmetic tasks involving small exact numbers of objects.
Yet, infants’ sensitivity to number shows striking limitations when compared to the power of the
simplest mathematical numbers: the integers, or ‘‘natural numbers.’’ In the large number range
(beyond 3 items), infants’ discrimination of numerosities is approximate and follows Weber’s law:
numerosities can be discriminated only if they differ by a minimal ratio (Xu, Spelke, & Goddard,
2005). The same imprecise representations are found in young children and even in educated adults,
when they are prevented from counting (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008; Halberda, Ly, Wilmer, Naiman,
& Germine, 2012; Piazza et al., 2010). Because of this limitation, numerosity perception fails to capture
two essential properties that are central to formalizations of the integers: the relation of exact numer-
ical equality and the successor function (Izard, Pica, Spelke, & Dehaene, 2008; Leslie, Gelman, &
Gallistel, 2008). The relation of exact numerical equality grounds integers in set-theoretic construc-
tions: two sets are equinumerous if and only if their elements can be placed in perfect one-to-one
correspondence (this is Hume’s principle). The successor function, on the other hand, is the initial
intuition underpinning the Peano–Dedekind axioms: here the integers are generated by successive
additions of one, i.e., by the iteration of a successor operation.
Theories diverge with regards to the origins of the concept of exact number in children’s develop-
ment. Some have proposed that exact number is innate, either because the properties of exact number
are built into the system of analog mental magnitude (Gelman & Gallistel, 1986), or because there is a
separate system giving children an understanding of exact equality and/or of the successor function
(Butterworth, 2010; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; Leslie et al., 2008; Rips, Bloomﬁeld, & Asmuth,
2008). For example, Leslie et al. proposed that children have an innate representation of the exact
quantity ONE that can be used iteratively to generate representations of exact numbers. In the same
vein, Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, and Gibson (2008) and Frank, Fedorenko, Lai, Saxe, and Gibson (2011)
proposed that humans can represent one-to-one correspondence non-symbolically and know intui-
tively that perfect one-to-one correspondence entails exact numerical equality. Other theorists have
proposed that the concept of exact number is constructed, and that symbols such as tally marks,
numerical expressions in natural language, abacus conﬁgurations, or other symbolic devices play a
crucial role in this process (Bialystok & Codd, 1997; Carey, 2009; Cooper, 1984; Fuson, 1988; Klahr
& Wallace, 1976; Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 2002; Piantadosi, Tenenbaum, & Goodman, 2012; Scha-
effer, Eggleston, & Scott, 1964; Spelke, 2003). For example, Carey (2009) proposed that children con-
struct the natural numbers by (1) learning the ordered list of count words as a set of uninterpreted
symbols, then (2) learning the exact meanings of the ﬁrst three or four count words, mapping the
words to representations of 1–4 objects that are attended in parallel, and ﬁnally (3) constructing an
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rays of objects.
To address the debate on the origins of exact number concepts, here we focused on one of the fun-
damental properties of the integers: the relation of exact numerical equality between sets. We asked
whether children understand this relation before they master linguistic or other symbols for exact
numbers.1.1. The relation of exact numerical equality
As we mentioned above, the set-theoretic deﬁnition of exact numbers relies on Hume’s principle:
two sets are equal in number if and only if they can be placed in perfect one-to-one correspondence.
This deﬁnition entails a list of characteristic principles of the relation of numerical equality, derived by
analyzing the impact of different types of transformations on two initially equal sets. Following a
strategy ﬁrst put forward by Gelman and Gallistel in their study of counting (Gelman, 1972a; Gelman
& Gallistel, 1986), we ﬁrst articulate three principles and then use them to assess children’s under-
standing of the relation of exact numerical equality. Crucially, our tests allow for the possibility that
children may understand some, but not all, of these principles.
(1) The Identity principle: If two sets are equal in number, they remain equal over transformations
that do not affect the identity of any member of either set, such as changes in the spatial posi-
tions of one set’s members.
(2) The Addition/Subtraction principle: If two sets are equal in number, an addition or subtraction
transformation applied to one of the sets disrupts the equality, even for minimal transforma-
tions of one item.
(3) The Substitution principle: Numerical equality is maintained over a different kind of transforma-
tion to one set: the substitution of one element by another item.
In the rest of this section, we show that each of these principles is a necessary constituent of the
relation of exact equality, and therefore a child could not be granted knowledge of exact equality if
he/she did not subscribe to all three principles. To do so, we show that waiving one or the other of
these principles still leads to coherent relations between sets, but not necessarily to the relation of ex-
act numerical equality. We also establish the relevance of our principles to cognitive development, as
waiving one or more of our three principles enables us to capture the different hypotheses put forward
in the literature on children’s number concepts.
Let us assume ﬁrst that children judge numerical equality based on perceptual similarity between
numerosities – in other words, that they are limited to a relation of approximate numerical equality. A
relation of approximate equality follows the Identity and Substitution principles, but not necessarily
the Addition/Subtraction principle. Under approximate equality, in accordance with the Identity and
Substitution principles, two sets remain approximately equal in number after the elements of the sets
have been displaced, or after one element has been substituted for another item. However, contrary to
the Addition/Subtraction principle, a child may judge a set to retain the same approximate number of
elements after an addition or subtraction, provided that the ratio difference produced by the transfor-
mation lies below his or her threshold for numerical discrimination. Understanding the Addition/
Subtraction principle is therefore diagnostic of children’s reasoning about exact as opposed to
approximate quantities.
Alternatively, early research by Piaget (1965) suggested that young children do not take the rela-
tion ‘‘same number’’ to follow the Identity principle, since children judge two matching lines of objects
to become unequal in number after one of the arrays is spread out. Piaget’s interpretation was later
contested, by appealing either to the pragmatics of the tasks by which numerical judgments were
elicited (Gelman, 1972b; Markman, 1979; McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974; Siegel, 1978) or to the
demands imposed on children’s executive resources (Borst, Poirel, Pineau, Cassotti, & Houdé, 2012).
Nevertheless, Piaget’s interpretation of the child’s concept of number can easily be captured through
the principles put forward above, as a failure to understand Identity. The Identity principle is thus
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principles to hold.
Finally, one could deﬁne yet another type of relation between sets, by waiving only the Substitution
principle. Without this principle, two sets may be judged unequal just because they are formed of dif-
ferent individuals, because Identity and Addition/Subtraction alone do not sufﬁce to construct two sets
that are different, yet equal. Again, negating the Substitution principle would still be compatible with
both the Identity and Addition/Subtraction principles. Consider, for example, a set speciﬁed by the iden-
tity of its members, such as the set of members of a family. This set changes with the replacement of a
family member by an unrelated individual (contrary to the Substitution principle) but is maintained
over movements of its individual members (in accord with the Identity principle) and grows with
the addition of new members (in accord with the Addition/Subtraction principle).
In summary, the principles of Identity, Addition/Subtraction, and Substitution jointly serve to charac-
terize the formal relation of exact numerical equality, since different relations can be deﬁned by waiv-
ing one or another principle. Past research indicates that children sometimes provide judgments that
accord with these deviant relations. In the present research, we investigated whether children can
represent the property of sets that accords to all three principles: exact numerical equality.
1.2. Early understanding of exact quantities
1.2.1. Small quantities
In stark contrast to Piaget’s (1965) theory, Gelman demonstrated that, when tested in the small
number range, even very young children are sensitive to exact differences in numerosity (Gelman,
1972b, 2006; Gelman & Gallistel, 1986). For example, when given the instruction that one of two
plates containing respectively 2 and 3 objects was ‘the winner’ (thus avoiding any reference to number
words), children under 3 years could recognize the target numerosity after the objects were displaced,
detected a change in number after the experimenter had surreptitiously added or removed an object
from a plate, and even offered a solution to undo the change. These results were later extended in re-
search with preverbal infants, who also proved able to detect a contrast between 2 and 3 objects (Fei-
genson et al., 2004; Féron, Gentaz, & Streri, 2006; Kobayashi, Hiraki, & Hasegawa, 2005; Kobayashi,
Hiraki, Mugitani, & Hasegawa, 2004; Wynn, 1992; see Bisazza, Piffer, Serena, & Agrillo, 2010; Rugani,
Fontanari, Simoni, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2009, for a demonstration of the same abilities in newly
hatched ﬁsh and chicks).
Nevertheless, young children’s sensitivity to exact small numerosities can be explained in three dif-
ferent ways. First, children may represent sets of 1, 2, or 3 objects as having distinct integer values, as
Gelman and Gallistel proposed (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Gelman & Gallistel, 1986). Second, children
may represent these sets as having distinct approximate numerical magnitudes, discriminating
between them exactly only because these small numbers differ from one another by large ratios
(Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; van Oeffelen & Vos, 1982). Third, children may represent these sets by
the mechanism of parallel tracking, whereby exact small numerosities are represented in a separate
format, through object ﬁles serving to index 1–3 individual objects (Feigenson et al., 2004; Hyde,
2011; Simon, 1997). In the latter case, children may represent the extension of a set (i.e., that the
set is composed of objects A, B, and C) without representing its cardinal value. The latter two possi-
bilities grant the youngest children an ability to process small numerosities in an exact fashion, but
without postulating that they do so by drawing on the integer concepts used by adults. These three
accounts can only be distinguished by research investigating whether the above abilities extend to
the large number range.
Unfortunately, the studies developed with small numbers cannot easily be extended to larger num-
bers, because perception is approximate in this range (Gelman, 2006). Yet, the fact that perception is
approximate does not preclude that children, like adults, may recognize that the numerosity of a set is
changed when one element is added to or removed from the set, and that it is preserved when both of
these operations are performed. In order to test for this possibility, previous research has turned to
children’s understanding of number words, guided by the assumption that the way children interpret
numerical symbols may reveal what kind of numerical concepts they spontaneously entertain (Condry
& Spelke, 2008; Fuson, 1988; Huang, Spelke, & Snedeker, 2010; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Le Corre, Van
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Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004). Therefore, we now turn to studies of children’s number word learning.
1.2.2. Children learning numerals
By the age of 5 years, children clearly recognize that the principles of exact numerical equality gov-
ern the usage of number words (Lipton & Spelke, 2006). To demonstrate this ability, Lipton and Spelke
presented 5-year-old children with a box full of objects and used a numerical expression to inform the
children of the number of objects contained in this box (e.g., ‘‘this box has eighty-seven marbles’’).
Next, the experimenter applied a transformation to the set by subtracting one object, by subtracting
half of the objects, or simply by shaking the box. The children rightly judged that the original number
word ceased to apply after a subtraction, even of just one item, but not after the box had been shaken.
Moreover, they returned to the original number word after the transformation was reversed by the
addition of one object, even when the object taken from the original set was replaced by a different
object. Crucially, the children showed this pattern of responses not only with number words to which
they could count, but also with words beyond their counting range.
Nevertheless, 5-year-old children have had years of exposure to number words. To address the de-
bate on the origins of integer concepts, researchers have thus turned to younger children near the on-
set of number word learning. Do these younger children understand that number words refer to
precise numerical quantities as soon as they recognize that these words refer to numbers?
Learning the verbal numerals starts around the age of 2 and progresses slowly (Fuson, 1988; Wynn,
1990). Children between the ages of 2 and 3½ typically can recite number words in order up to ‘‘ten’’,
but map only a subset of these words (usually only the ﬁrst three number words or fewer) to exact
cardinal values. For these children (hereafter, ‘‘subset-knowers’’), number word knowledge is often as-
sessed by asking them to produce sets of verbally speciﬁed numbers (hereafter, the ‘‘Give-N’’ task;
Wynn, 1990). Among subset-knowers, some children succeed only for ‘‘one’’ (‘‘one-knowers’’) and pro-
duce sets of variable numerosity (but never sets containing just one object) for all other number
words; other children show this pattern of understanding for ‘‘two’’ or even ‘‘three’’ and ‘‘four’’, but
produce larger sets of variable numerosity when asked for larger numbers.
Children at this stage are thought to lack an understanding of the cardinal principle, i.e., the fact
that the last word uttered in a count refers to the number of objects in the set that was counted. In
contrast, children succeeding at the give-N task are usually referred to as ‘‘Cardinal Principle Knowers’’
(hereafter, CP-Knowers). Becoming a CP-Knower has been thought to mark a crucial induction where
children construct a new concept of exact number (Carey, 2009; Piantadosi et al., 2012; although see
Davidson, Eng, & Barner, 2012). Thus, to address the debate on the origins of exact numbers, in the rest
of this paper we focus on the number concepts of children who have not yet mastered counting: sub-
set-knowers.
Do subset-knowers understand that number words refer to precise quantities, deﬁned in terms of
exact equality? In the small number range, by deﬁnition, subset-knowers apply their known number
words to exact quantities, as do adults. To be classiﬁed as a ‘‘two-knower’’, for example, a child must
systematically give exactly one and two objects when asked for one and two objects respectively, and
he/she must not give one or two objects when asked for other numbers. In line with this competence,
for quantities within the range of their known number words, children’s interpretation of number
words accords with the relation of exact numerical equality (Condry & Spelke, 2008): children choose
a different number word after a transformation that affects one-to-one correspondence (such as addi-
tion), but not after a transformation that does not affect the set (such as rearrangement). Nevertheless,
these abilities are open to the same three interpretations as is children’s performance in Gelman’s
‘‘winner’’ task (Gelman, 1972a, 2006; Gelman & Gallistel, 1986): Known number words may designate
exact cardinal values; they may designate approximate numerosities (and yield exact responding be-
cause of the large ratio differences between sets of 1, 2, and 3); or the meaning of these words may be
deﬁned through representations constructed in terms of parallel object tracking, a mechanism that is
not available for larger numerosities. Studies of subset-knowers’ application of larger number words
are needed to determine whether subset-knowers interpret exact numerals in terms of exact numbers.
In contrast to their performance with words for small numbers, subset-knowers do not consistently
apply words for larger numbers to precise quantities, even for words that they use when they engage
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Spelke, 2008; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004), and different interpretations have been proposed for these
discrepant results: children’s responses may either reﬂect limits to their conceptual competence, or
variations of their strategic performance (Brooks et al., 2012). We will return to this debate in the
General Discussion; at this point, it sufﬁces to note that subset-knowers do not consistently generalize
number words according to exact number. Therefore, the study of children’s interpretation of number
words does not yet reveal whether subset-knowers use exact numerical equality in applying number
words.
Even if subset-knowers do not interpret number words as referring to precise quantities, however,
this failure need not imply that they fail to understand exact numerical equality in non-linguistic con-
texts. Children could very well favor alternative interpretations for number words, even if they have a
concept of exact numerical equality (see Huang et al., 2010 for evidence that when subset-knowers are
trained on the number words beyond their knowledge level, they sometimes interpret these new
number words in terms of approximate quantity). Indeed, an interpretation of number words in terms
of approximate quantity might receive more support from experience than an interpretation in terms
of exact quantity. When children hear number words, they usually do not have the means to register
the exact number of objects presented. According to some theories, moreover, number words have
inexact meanings even for adults, who use pragmatic inferences to restrict number word reference
in some contexts. These meanings may extend to children, whose usage of number words is further
limited by the demands of making the appropriate pragmatic inferences (Barner & Bachrach, 2009).
In summary, studies of children’s number word learning and interpretation provide suggestive, but
not conclusive, evidence bearing on young children’s numerical concepts. Therefore, in our search for
the origins of the concept of exact number, we constructed a task testing children’s knowledge of the
relation of exact numerical equality without calling on number words. In this task, we provided sub-
set-knowers with one-to-one correspondence cues to make exact discriminations between quantities
available to perception, and we tested children’s ability to use these cues to give judgments on exact
quantities. Across experiments, we asked whether subset-knowers would interpret one-to-one corre-
spondence mappings in accordance with the three principles of numerical equality described above:
one-to-one mappings between two sets are preserved as long as the elements in the two sets remain
identical, they change when a single item is added to or taken from one of the sets, and they remain
constant over a substitution, within one set, of one item for another.1.3. Overview of the experiments
All the children included in the studies were less than 3 years of age and failed to understand the
exact meaning of number words beyond four, as assessed by a give-N task. In ﬁve experiments, par-
ticipants were presented with a set of ﬁnger puppets placed in one-to-one correspondence with the
branches of a toy tree, which, in most conditions, made a difference of one puppet easily detectable.
In each trial, the puppets were taken from the tree and placed in an opaque box, while the experi-
menter narrated and acted out a story that sometimes resulted in a transformation of the set (addition,
subtraction, substitution, or identity-preserving transformation). Children’s representation of the set
of puppets in the box was assessed by allowing children to retrieve either all the puppets, or all but
one puppet, and then measuring the time children spent searching in the box for more puppets.2. General methods
2.1. Participants
Ninety-three children (53 females) aged 32:08 to 35:26 (months:days) participated in the experi-
ments. An additional 33 children were excluded because of video equipment failure (3), error in the
procedure (2), because the children refused to participate or follow instructions (13), they were not
native speakers of English (3), they were found to succeed at the give-N task (see procedures and data
analyses below) (11), or because they could not be classiﬁed as either a subset-knower or a CP-knower
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of contacts for the greater Boston area. Children were mostly Caucasian from a middle-class back-
ground, although some African- and Asian-American children were tested as well. The study was ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Harvard University. Written consent was obtained
from one or both parents, and the children gave oral consent.
Participants could only be included in the analyses if they had one valid trial in each of two con-
ditions: box expected to be empty and box expected to contain one puppet (see below for the trial
inclusion criteria). These criteria resulted in ﬁnal samples of 12–36 subset-knowers per experiment;
the groups are described in the Method section of each experiment. Detailed information on the num-
ber of subjects and trials excluded in each experiment are provided in the Appendix in Table A.1.
2.2. Displays
Displays were sets of identical animal ﬁnger puppets made of rubber. Different animals were used
across trials to maintain interest. The animals could be placed on the branches of a ‘‘tree’’, a custom-
made device with sticks protruding in a line (Fig. 1). An opaque box covered with colorful fabric served
as the hiding box. The box had an opening on the top, which could be covered by a piece of felt to fully
hide its contents.
2.3. Procedure
Children were tested in a quiet laboratory roomwith their caregiver seated behind them. All exper-
iments started with the same three training trials. In the ﬁrst training trial, two animal puppets, per-
ceptibly different from each other, were placed on two branches of a tree with 6 branches. The
children were then told that night was coming, and the puppets wanted to go sleep in their box. After
the puppets were placed in the box there was a short delay, and then the experimenter and the child
proceeded to wake up the puppets: the experimenter knocked on the box, searched and got the ﬁrst
puppet, placed it on the tree, and then encouraged the child to get the other puppet. The second train-
ing trial was identical to the ﬁrst, but with three puppets (still different from each other), and the child
was expected to ﬁnd two of them by her/himself. When all three puppets were placed back on the
tree, the experimenter asked, ‘‘Now do we have all the puppets?’’ Most children answeredFig. 1. Displays used in the experiments. (A) Searching box. (B) Example of sets of 6 and 5 puppets placed on a ‘tree’ with 6
branches. (C) Example of a set of 3 puppets placed on a tree with 3 branches in Experiment 3. (D) Example of a set of 6 puppets
placed on a tree with 11 branches in Experiment 5.
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not ﬁnd anything, the experimenter stated that all puppets were present.
The third and ﬁnal training trial was intended to emphasize that the branches could be used as cues
for tracking the puppets. The trial started with 5 (perceptibly different) puppets placed on 5 of the 6
branches. Once the puppets were in place, the experimenter pointed to the empty branch, and ex-
plained that since no puppet was sitting on that branch, a ﬂower would be placed on it. The ﬂower
was attached to the base of the branch with a magnet. After that, the trial unfolded as the previous
ones: the puppets ﬁrst went to sleep in the box, and then they came back to the tree after a short de-
lay. The experimenter helped the child to ﬁnd the ﬁrst three puppets and place them on the tree. If the
child placed one puppet on the branch with the ﬂower, the experimenter explained that nobody
should be placed on that branch because of the ﬂower. If the child insisted on placing a puppet on that
particular branch, the experimenter moved the ﬂower. If a second attempt was made to place another
puppet on the branch with the ﬂower, the experimenter did not comment and let the child place the
puppet there. After three puppets were retrieved, the child was handed the box, with the request, ‘‘Can
you look for the rest?’’ If the child stopped searching at some point, the experimenter asked, ‘‘Now do
we have all the puppets?’’ If the child answered positively, and a puppet was missing, the experi-
menter pointed to an empty branch (without the ﬂower) and said, ‘‘But nobody is sitting here, there
must be another puppet in the box’’. If all puppets were already placed back on the branches, the
experimenter pointed to the branch with the ﬂower (moving the ﬂower to the empty branch if
needed) and said, ‘‘Here we have a ﬂower, so nobody should be seating on that branch. We have all
the puppets!’’
Following the training procedure, each child was given four experimental trials (either four trials in
the same experiment or two blocks of two trials in different experiments). In contrast to the training
procedure, at test sets were all made of identical puppets. The number of puppets and branches on the
tree varied across experiments and will be described below. Nevertheless, in each experiment the
child received at least two trials that differed from each other only in terms of one puppet, thus allow-
ing us to record the impact of this minimal difference on the searching behavior of the child.
At the beginning of a trial, all the puppets were placed on the branches of the tree. Most of the time
(except in Experiment 5), the starting situation involved either the same number of puppets and
branches, or one fewer puppets than branches. To make sure that the children encoded the starting
situation, the experimenter gave a verbal description: ‘‘We have puppets everywhere on that tree!’’
or, pointing to the empty branch: ‘‘Nobody is sitting here. But it is ok, it is just a small family of pup-
pets!’’ Then, all the puppets were put in the box. During that phase, different events occurred with a
potential impact on the number of puppets; they are speciﬁc to each experiment and will be described
below. After this short delay, the experimenter and the child proceeded to wake up the puppets and
put them back on the tree. No attempt was made to leave the same branch empty as in the starting
conﬁguration. The experimenter helped put the ﬁrst puppets on the tree, leaving only two branches
of the tree empty. She then handed the box to the child asking him/her to ﬁnd ‘‘the rest’’. Crucially,
at that point, whatever the total number of puppets, there was only one puppet in the box (on trials
with more puppets, the experimenter hid the last puppet in her hand), and this puppet was placed in
the box such that it should be easy to ﬁnd.
Once given the box, the child reached and found this puppet. The crucial measurement started
when the puppet was placed on the tree: the child was given an 8-s time window during which
searching in the box was recorded. During the searching window, the experimenter smiled and looked
straight at the child, and intervened only if the child attempted to remove puppets from the tree. After
8 s, the experimenter asked the child a closing question (‘‘Now do we have all the puppets?’’) and then
provided feedback. For the trials with one fewer puppets than branches, she said, ‘‘Yes we do! It is a
small family of puppets’’; for the other trials, she looked puzzled and reached in the box, sneaking the
last puppet back into the box. The child was then invited to go and reach for the last puppet him/
herself.
After they had participated in four experimental trials, children were given a short version of the
give-N task. This task was intended to ascertain whether the children had words for exact integers
(i.e., whether they were CP-knowers), rather than determine their exact knowledge level for small
numbers. Children were presented with 15 rubber ﬁsh and a bowl (the ‘‘pond’’). They were ﬁrst asked
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for N  1 ﬁsh. If the children failed to give 3, then 2, then 1 ﬁsh (generally by compulsively putting all
15 ﬁsh in the bowl whatever the request), the method was changed, asking the child to put the ﬁsh in
the hands of the experimenter, starting from a 1 ﬁsh request. Children were classiﬁed as subset-know-
ers once they failed at two requests for a number N (bowl or hands methods, whichever yielded better
performance), even if they succeeded at numbers smaller than N. Children were classiﬁed as CP-know-
ers if they successfully gave 3, 4, and 5 ﬁsh.12.4. Data coding
The data were video-recorded for later coding. Trials were excluded from the analyses if any of the
following applied: (1) the child showed excessive distraction and did not comply with the trial script;
(2) the child searched for the puppet that preceded the window where search was recorded for more
than 10 s (we reasoned that if the child had to search for a long time for the N  1th puppet, that
would give him/her some indication that there was no Nth puppet remaining in the box); or (3) the
experimenter or the caregiver asked the closing question (‘‘Now do we have all the puppets?’’) before
the end of the searching window. Two coders watched the video and used a custom-made python pro-
gram in order to measure the searching time for the N  1th puppet, the time the child searched for a
Nth puppet (within the 8-s time window starting when the N  1th puppet was placed on the tree),
and the time of occurrence of the question closing the trial, with respect to this searching window.
Twenty-eight of the 324 trials were excluded from analyses, for experimenter error (4), excessive dis-
traction (9), searching for the N  1th puppet for more than 10 s (9 trials + 1 other trial where search-
ing time for the N  1th puppet could not be assessed), unclear searching behavior (2), or closing
question asked too early (3). Because analyses were meaningful only if a child contributed data both
in a trial where the box was expected to be empty and in a trial where the box was expected to contain
one puppet, this resulted in the exclusion of 0–9 children from the analyses in each experiment.
When searching time was measured, the tape was played at slow speed (1/6), and each coder re-
corded searching by pressing keys on separate gamepads. The following behaviors were included in
the searching time: (1) reaching inside the box (from the moment the child’s hand entered the box
to the moment it exited), (2) looking inside the box (from the moment the child’s gaze was aligned
with the opening of the box to the moment the child looked away), and (3) shaking the box to listen
for noise (from the moment the child picked up the box to the moment when the shaking ended or the
box was returned to the table). One of the coders was the experimenter, who advanced the tape at
appropriate places. The other coder was blind to the condition and to the hypotheses. The program
recorded agreement between coders by sampling their judgment (search/no search) every 30 ms. If
the agreement was under 90% (16/279 trials), a second measurement was attempted, and the most
convergent measurement was kept for analyses. For the ﬁnal sample of 279 trials, the average agree-
ment between the two coders was 98.8% (97.4% if considering only the trials with non-zero searching
time). Analyses were conducted on the mean of the searching times measured by the two coders.2.5. Analyses
Results were analyzed using ANOVAs with one between- or within- subject factor for Condition (if
appropriate), and one within-subject factor for Outcome (box expected empty vs. box expected to con-
tain one puppet). Data within condition were analyzed with simple ANOVAs with one factor for Out-
come. Preliminary analyses ensured that Gender, Order of presentation of outcomes (starting with a
trial where the box was expected empty vs. was expected to contain one puppet), and trial Pair did
not interact with Outcome in each experiment (ps > .05).1 After the give-N task, the children were prompted to count all the ﬁsh placed in a line on the table, in order to record their
ability to recite the counting list. However, owing to the duration of the two ﬁrst tasks, many children were tired at that point and
refused to follow the experimenter’s instructions (caregivers nonetheless afﬁrmed that the children could recite the ﬁrst few count
words). Therefore, the counting data were not considered in the analyses.
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motion and occlusion
Experiment 1 tested whether subset-knowers could use one-to-one correspondence cues to recon-
struct the exact number of objects in sets of 5 or 6 identical puppets, placed on a tree with 6 branches.
In this basic situation, puppets were placed in an opaque box, and then returned to the tree after a
short delay. After placing 5 puppets on the tree, children’s searching time for a 6th puppet was com-
pared across trials with sets of 5 and 6 puppets: if children could distinguish between these sets, they
should search longer when the set consisted of 6 puppets.
All children were also tested on their ability to discriminate sets of 5 vs. 6 puppets in a second con-
dition, where the branches of the tree did not provide additional information. This test was the same
as the main experiment, except that the puppets were placed on a tree with 11 rather than 6 branches:
thus, the number of empty branches when the puppets were placed on the tree was also 5 or 6. If the
children were using the branches to reconstruct the exact number of puppets in the main experiment,
their performance should drop in this second condition.3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The ﬁnal sample of children consisted of 12 subset-knowers (8 female, mean age 34.14 months,
32:06–35:18).3.1.2. Procedure
Following the training procedure (see general methods), each child was given four experimental
trials: two trials with a 6-branch tree, followed by two trials with an 11-branch tree. Trials started
with 5 or 6 identical puppets placed on the tree. After the puppets were placed in the box, the box
was shaken lightly while the experimenter told a brief story about the puppets sleeping. Half the chil-
dren were tested with 5 puppets ﬁrst, and half with 6 puppets ﬁrst. Trials with 5 and 6 puppets were6 branches 11 branches
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Fig. 2. Searching times for Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, the set of puppets was simply returned to the tree after a short delay.
The puppets were either placed on a tree with 6 branches (informative one-to-one correspondence cues) or on a tree with 11
branches (non-informative one-to-one correspondence cues). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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puppets followed by a trial with 6 puppets in the 6-branch condition, he/she was ﬁrst tested in the 11-
branch condition with 6 puppets, then with 5 puppets.3.2. Results
Fig. 2 presents the ﬁndings from this experiment. When the tree had six branches, the children
were able to make an exact discrimination between sets of 5 and 6 puppets: they spent more time
searching for a 6th puppet when the set really contained 6 puppets than when it contained 5 puppets,
F(1,11) = 5.0, p = .047, g2p ¼ :31. In contrast, when the branches were too numerous to support tracking
of the set, searching was not signiﬁcantly different for trials starting with 5 or 6 puppets,2,3
F(1,10) = 3.4, p = .095, g2p ¼ :25. The difference in behavior yielded a signiﬁcant interaction between
Set Size (5 or 6 puppets) and Condition (6 branches or 11 branches), F(1,10) = 11.7, p = .0065, g2p ¼ :54.3.3. Discussion
When the branches could be used to support the discrimination of sets of 5 vs. 6 puppets, children
searched longer in the box when the last puppet was missing than when all puppets had already been
retrieved. In contrast, they failed to solve the task when the correspondence between branches and
puppets did not provide any useful information. Because all children were screened for knowledge
of large number words using the diagnostic give-N task, and only those who failed this test were in-
cluded in the experiment, the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 provide evidence that children can take advan-
tage of one-to-one correspondence cues to make exact discriminations between large numbers of
objects, before they learn symbols for large exact numbers.
These ﬁndings raise the question of whether children can make a further inference about one-to-
one mappings: that such mappings are disrupted by the addition or the subtraction of one object.
Experiment 2 addressed this question. Furthermore, we sought to obtain more data on the 11-branch
condition, where branches were too numerous to support discrimination of 5 vs. 6 puppets; these new
data would increase our statistical power and enable us to test whether subset-knowers could ever
succeed in reconstructing large sets of objects, even without support from one-to-one correspondence
cues. The full set of 11-branch results will be presented as Experiment 5, after the results of the exper-
iments presenting informative one-to-one correspondence cues.4. Experiment 2: Subset-knowers’ use of one-to-one correspondence to reconstruct large sets of
objects over addition or subtraction
Experiment 2 used the method of Experiment 1 to investigate whether subset-knowers could use
one-to-one correspondence cues to reconstruct the exact number of objects in a set, after an addition
or a subtraction of one item. As in Experiment 1, children ﬁrst viewed sets of 5 or 6 puppets arranged
on a tree with 6 branches. While the puppets were in the box, an event occurred that resulted in the
addition or subtraction of either one puppet or one branch. If children could successfully take into ac-
count these additions and subtractions, they should search longer for sets containing 6 puppets at the
end of the transformation event. If instead children disregarded the effects of the additions and sub-
tractions, they should search longer on trials starting with as many puppets as branches, as in Exper-
iment 1. Finally, it was possible that children might be uncertain about the effects of the additions and
subtractions, in which case they might search equally across trials.2 One of the children did not contribute data in both 11-branch trials and was excluded from this analysis.
3 The results of the 11-branch condition will be analyzed in further detail in Experiment 5. In the full data set, as here, we
observed an unexpected reversal of searching times. Analyses performed on the full data set of Experiment 5 shed light on the
origins of this effect (see Experiment 5 Results and discussion).
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4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 24 subset-knowers (8 female, mean age 34.15 months, 32:15–35:26).
4.1.2. Displays and procedure
All training and testing was as in Experiment 1, except that in the experimental trials, an additional
event happened while the puppets were in the box. For one group of children, additions and subtrac-
tions were applied to the puppets (puppet addition/subtraction condition); for another group of chil-
dren, additions and subtractions were applied to the branches (branch addition/subtraction
condition). In each condition, children received two trials, one resulting in a group of 5 puppets,
and one resulting in a group of 6 puppets, both to be placed on a tree with 6 branches (so we could
compare searching across sets of 5 and 6 puppets, just as in Experiment 1).
For the puppet addition/subtraction condition, the outcome-6 trial started with a group of 5 pup-
pets placed on a tree with 6 branches. Then, while the puppets were in the box, the experimenter took
an extra puppet out her sleeve, and put it in the box, narrating, ‘‘Look at that, here is another puppet
coming!’’. The outcome-5 trial started with a group of 6 puppets, one per branch on the tree. After all
the puppets were placed in the box, the experimenter reached in the box and removed one puppet,
showed it to the child, and put it in a bag on the ﬂoor, narrating, ‘‘He does not want to sleep; he is
going to the jungle’’.
For the branch addition/subtraction condition, new trees were crafted such that one branch could
be either added or removed (beginning with 5 or 7 branches and ending with 6 branches). The out-
come-5 trial started with a tree with 5 branches (no empty branch). Then, while the puppets were
in the box, the experimenter added a new branch to the tree, narrating, ‘‘That night, there is a big
storm with lots of wind, a new branch is coming!’’ The rest of the trial unfolded as before with the
tree now having 6 branches. The outcome-6 trial started with 6 puppets placed on a tree with 7
branches (one empty branch). Again, while the puppets were in the box, the experimenter described
a storm in which one of the branches ﬂew away, thus resulting in 6 puppets to be placed on a tree with
6 branches.Branch 
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(n=12)
Puppet
addition/subtraction 
(n=12)
Experiment 2 - Searching times for a 6th puppet 
Box expected empty Box expected to contain 1 puppet
0 
1000
3000
5000 ms
ns
ns
ns
Fig. 3. Searching times for Experiment 2. In the puppet addition/subtraction condition, one puppet was either added to or
subtracted from the set while the puppets were hidden in the box. In the branch addition/subtraction condition, one branch was
either added to or subtracted from the tree while the puppets were hidden in the box. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.
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condition, as in Experiment 1. All the data of the 11-branch condition will be pooled together and ana-
lyzed as Experiment 5.
4.2. Results
Fig. 3 presents the ﬁndings. In contrast to Experiment 1, children’s searching time did not differ be-
tween the outcome-5 and the outcome-6 trials, F(1,22) < 1, g2p ¼ :04. This was true of each condition
tested separately: F(1,11) = 1.4, p = .27, g2p ¼ :11 for the puppet addition/subtraction condition,
Fð1; 11Þ < 1;g2p < :01 for the branch addition/subtraction condition, and no interaction was observed
between Condition and Outcome size: F(1,22) < 1, g2p ¼ :02. Children were not able to construct the
correct one-to-one correspondence relation after the addition and subtraction events, whether the
events were applied to a set that was invisible at the moment of the transformation (the puppets)
or to a set that remained visible throughout the trial (the branches).
4.3. Discussion
The ﬁndings of Experiment 2 provided no evidence that children appreciated how the operations of
adding or subtracting should affect the one-to-one correspondence mapping between the puppets and
the branches. There are several possible reasons for children’s random search performance following
the addition and subtraction events. One family of possibilities, to be evaluated in the next experi-
ment, is that children failed to attend to, remember, or understand the transformations. Note that this
failure could not have been absolute, since if the transformations were simply deleted from their
memory, the children would have responded based on the size of the starting set as in Experiment
1, leading to below-chance performance in Experiment 2. Nevertheless, it is possible that children
knew that something had happened, but did not understand exactly what had happened and how
it impacted the set of puppets. Experiment 3 was undertaken to explore this possibility.
5. Experiment 3: Children’s processing of addition and subtraction of one, applied to small sets of
objects
Experiment 3 tested whether children could remember and process the transformations presented
in Experiment 2 when the addition and subtraction events were performed on smaller sets, within the
range of children’s object-tracking abilities.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Participants were 12 subset-knowers (7 female, mean age 33.94 month, 32:13–35:13).
5.1.2. Displays
Displays were sets of 2 or 3 ﬁnger puppets, placed on a new tree that was constructed with only 3
branches. For the purpose of the branch addition/subtraction condition, additional trees were crafted to
allow for the addition or removal of a branch (beginningwith2or 4branches and endingwith3branches).
5.1.3. Procedure
The children were ﬁrst familiarized with the task using the same initial 3 trials as in Experiments 1
and 2. Following familiarization, children were given two trials in a puppet addition/subtraction con-
dition, and two trials in a branch addition/subtraction condition, with order of presentation of condi-
tion and of trial outcome (2 puppets or 3 puppets) counterbalanced. The trials followed the procedure
of Experiment 2, except with smaller sets of puppets and branches. For the puppet addition/subtrac-
tion condition, the outcome-3 trial started with 2 puppets on 3 branches, and the transformation
event consisted in one puppet being taken from the sleeve of the experimenter and added to the
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event showed one puppet being removed from the box and hidden in a bag on the ﬂoor. In the branch
addition/subtraction condition, the outcome-2 trial started with 2 puppets on 2 branches, and one ex-
tra branch was added to the tree while the puppets were in the box. The outcome-3 trial started with 3
puppets on 4 branches, and one branch was removed from the tree while the puppets were in the box.
After each transformation event, the experimenter reached for the ﬁrst puppet in the box and
placed it on the tree. She then handed the box to the child. The searching time measurement started
after the child had found the 2nd puppet and had placed it on the tree.5.2. Results
Children solved this task easily (Fig. 4), showing a reliable effect of the Outcome size in the correct
direction, F(1,10) = 307.7, p < .001, g2p ¼ :97. There was no effect of Condition, F(1,10) = 1.6, p = .24,
g2p ¼ :14, and no interaction of Condition and Outcome Size, Fð1; 9Þ < 1;g2p < :01. Additional ANOVAs
conﬁrmed that, in each condition, the children searched longer for the 3rd puppet in the trials in
which the transformation resulted in 3 puppets (puppet addition/subtraction condition:
F(1,9) = 101.1, p < .001, g2p ¼ :92; branch addition/subtraction condition: F(1,11) = 78.6, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :88). Furthermore, performance was signiﬁcantly better with the small numbers of Experiment
3 compared to the large numbers of Experiment 2 (interaction between Experiment and Outcome Size
for the puppet addition/subtraction condition: F(1,20) = 13.5, p = .0015, g2p ¼ :40; for the branch addi-
tion/subtraction condition: F(1,22) = 15.0, p < .001, g2p ¼ :40).5.3. Discussion
In the context of small numbers, children were able to remember and process addition and subtrac-
tion transformations adeptly. They were equally able to do so whether the transformation affected a
visible or an invisible set (branches or puppets). This ﬁnding converges with a host of researchBox expected empty Box expected to contain 1 puppet
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Fig. 4. Searching times for Experiment 3. The two test conditions corresponded to the puppet and branch addition/subtraction
conditions of Experiment 2, but with small numbers of puppets and branches. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean.
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jects (Gelman, 1972b; Gelman & Gallistel, 1986).
The children’s success in Experiment 3 provided evidence that they were able to remember and
understand the transformation events, thus excluding memory of the transformation events and other
limits to processing the transformations as the reason for the children’s failure in Experiment 2. Three
potential explanations for this failure remain. First, perhaps children were able to remember a trans-
formation event while tracking a small set of objects, but remembering both a transformation and a
one-to-one mapping between branches and puppets exceeded their memory capacity. Indeed, in con-
trast to the conditions presenting large sets of puppets, it is possible that children did not use the
branches to succeed with small sets, given that the set sizes did not exceed their object-tracking limit.
Second, perhaps children remembered both the starting conﬁguration and the transformation, but
failed to combine these pieces of information so as to update their expectations for the ﬁnal mapping
between puppets and branches. In all the transformations used so far (additions and subtractions), the
end conﬁguration was different from the starting conﬁguration, hence the need to update themapping.
Third, perhaps children of this age do not have a full understanding of whether transformations affect
one-to-one mappings between sets; in other words, maybe children fail to recognize that relations
established by one-to-one pairings follow the principle of Addition/Subtraction. Under this hypothesis,
children in Experiment 2 were unsure whether the transformation events affected the one-to-one cor-
respondence mapping between the branches and puppets, and thus they stopped attending to this
mapping altogether. Experiment 4 was undertaken to distinguish these potential explanations.6. Experiment 4: Children’s use of one-to-one correspondence cues to reconstruct large sets
through transformation events preserving number
In Experiment 4, children were tested again with large numbers, but with transformations that did
not affect one-to-one correspondence mappings, therefore removing the burden of having to update
this mapping. As in Experiment 2, the transformations involved removing or adding one puppet to
a box containing either 5 or 6 puppets. Two types of events were presented to the children. In the
identity condition, one puppet ﬁrst exited the box and then returned to the box after a short delay.
At the end of the trial, the ﬁnal set was thus composed of exactly the same individuals as at the start
of the trial. The substitution condition differed in that the puppet returning to the box was a different
individual from the puppet that left the box: This event thus preserved the number of elements in the
set but not the identity of all its individual members.
If children were not able to combine information about one-to-one mappings with information
about transformation events, for example by failing to remember both pieces of information at the
same time, then they should fail to distinguish between the events involving 5 vs. 6 objects in either
condition. If children interpreted one-to-one correspondence as establishing numerical equivalence
(i.e., if they realized that additions and subtractions affect one-to-one mappings and that substitutions
do not) but failed to compute the updated one-to-one mapping in the addition/subtraction conditions
of Experiment 2, then they should succeed in both the identity and the substitution conditions. Finally,
if children could use one-to-one mappings to establish a correspondence relation among speciﬁc ob-
jects, but not to establish numerical equivalence, then they should succeed in the identity condition
but fail in the substitution condition.6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
Participants were 24 subset-knowers (16 female, mean age 34.04, 32:11–35:22).6.1.2. Displays
Displays were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. A 6-branch tree was used, with sets of 5 or 6
puppets.
42 V. Izard et al. / Cognitive Psychology 72 (2014) 27–536.1.3. Procedure
Children received 4 experimental trials: two trials with sets of 5 puppets, and two trials with sets of
6 puppets, presented in a semi-alternating order as in past experiments. In both the identity and sub-
stitution conditions, the transformation event started with a puppet taken out of the box. In the iden-
tity condition, this puppet was returned to the box after narrating a cover story (‘‘He is going to get a
snack’’). The cover story varied between the ﬁrst and second pair of trials in an effort to maintain inter-
est. The events in the substitution condition resulted in the substitution of one puppet by another
identical puppet. Again, two story lines were used for the ﬁrst and second trial pairs. In the ﬁrst pair
of trials, the substitution was enacted as a subtraction followed by an addition. The experimenter ﬁrst
took a puppet out of the box and placed it in a bag on the ﬂoor, narrating, ‘‘He does not want to sleep;
he is going to the jungle’’. Then, she took another puppet out of her sleeve and placed it in the box with
the other puppets. For the second pair, we used a story line that emphasized the substitution, by
showing two puppets swapping location. In this story, ﬁrst the experimenter took a puppet from
the box and placed it on the top of the box, narrating, ‘‘He is calling a friend’’. She then took a second
puppet out of her sleeve and proceeded to exchange the location of the two puppets: the puppet from
the sleeve went to the box, and the puppet from the box went to the sleeve. In both events, the sub-
stitution puppet was strictly identical to the original puppet.
6.2. Results
Fig. 5 presents the ﬁndings. Children’s performance differed across conditions, as indicated by a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between the factors of Condition (identity vs. substitution) and Set Size (5 or 6
puppets), F(1,22) = 4.5, p = .046, g2p ¼ :17. As in Experiment 1, children tested in the identity condition
searched longer for a 6th puppet when the set contained 6 puppets, F(1,11) = 8.1, p = .016, g2p ¼ :42.
Thus, they were able to reconstruct the exact number of puppets over an intervening event that in-
volved the removal and return of one element of the set but preserved the identity of each element.
In contrast, children did not modulate their searching time with set size in the substitution condition,
Fð1; 11Þ < 1;g2p ¼ :04.Substitution
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Fig. 5. Searching times for Experiment 4. In the identity condition, one puppet was subtracted from the box and then added
back, resulting in no change in the set. In the substitution condition, one puppet was subtracted from the box and then a
different, featurally identical puppet was added to the box. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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The ﬁndings of Experiment 4 provide evidence that children are able to preserve a one-to-one cor-
respondence relation over events in which an object is removed from and then returned to a set, an
event that does not change either the set’s cardinal value or the identity of any of its members. This
result conﬁrms and extends the ﬁndings of Experiment 1, by showing that children are able to remem-
ber a one-to-one mapping between a large number of branches and puppets while attending to an
intervening event. Indeed, the events presented in the identity condition were neither shorter nor sim-
pler than those in the addition/subtraction conditions from Experiment 2; thus, children’s patterns of
success and failure across conditions could not easily be related to the complexity of the intervening
transformation.
In contrast, children failed to use one-to-one correspondence relations to reconstruct a large set
after a substitution event in which one puppet of the set was replaced by another puppet. Impor-
tantly, the identity and substitution transformations were equivalent in terms of numerical opera-
tions: one puppet exited the box, and later an identical-looking puppet entered the box. The
children were nonetheless affected by the identity or distinctness of the puppets exiting and re-
entering the box, i.e., whether a single individual participated in both transformations. These results
provide strong evidence that the children were not processing the events numerically (in which
case the two conditions would have been equivalent), and instead were registering individual ob-
jects. In other words, children used one-to-one correspondence cues as cues to speciﬁc individuals,
rather than as markers of numerical equality. Set transformations posed difﬁculties for children,
even when those transformations brought about no change in a one-to-one correspondence
mapping.
Because of their theoretical importance, we sought to probe the robustness of the ﬁndings of
Experiment 4 with a larger sample, and therefore we conducted two additional experiments (see de-
tailed procedures and results in the Appendix). In Experiment 4B, we presented the identity and sub-
stitution events to 32 subset-knowers (16 female, average age 33.96 months, 32:00–35:29) in a
within-subject design. Here again, the children used the one-to-one correspondence cues to recon-
struct the sets after the identity events, 2495 ms vs. 3997 ms, F(1,26) = 5.6, p = .026, g2p ¼ :18, but
not after the substitution events, 1723 ms vs. 2301 ms, Fð1; 29Þ < 1;g2p ¼ :021; however, this time
the interaction between Condition and Set Size did not reach signiﬁcance, F(1,24) = 1.4, p = .25,
g2p ¼ :05. We then performed a third experiment (Experiment 4C), which also served to evaluate
the impact of the training procedure on children’s use of branches as cues. Twenty-four children
(13 female, average age 33.98 months, 32:05–35:26) were tested in the same conditions as in Exper-
iment 4, except that the last training trial, designed to attract children’s attention to the branches,
was omitted. This time, the children’s longer search for a set of 6 vs. 5 puppets failed to reach signif-
icance in the identity condition, 1812 ms (5 puppets) vs. 2247 ms (6 puppets), F(1,11) = .33, p = .58,
g2p ¼ :029, while searching times for the two sets again were equivalent in the substitution condition,
1260 ms vs. 1270 ms, Fð1; 11Þ ¼ :04; p ¼ :85;g2p < :01. Again, there was no interaction between Con-
dition and Set Size, F(1,22) = .35, p = .46, g2p ¼ :015.
We next pooled all the data together (n = 80) in a mixed-model analysis to probe the robustness of
the ﬁndings and perform comparisons across experiments. This analysis accorded exactly with the ori-
ginal ﬁndings of Experiment 4: we obtained a main effect of Set Size, v2(1) = 6.8, p = .009, a main effect
of Condition, v2(1) = 8.1, p = .004, and most crucially, an interaction between these two factors,
v2(1) = 4.5, p = 0.034. None of these effects was signiﬁcantly modulated by Experiment (this was also
true when Experiments 4B and 4C were compared separately with Experiment 4: see Appendix). In
summary, while the pooled analysis indicated that the differences observed across experiments were
not statistically reliable, it provided further support for the conclusions derived from Experiment 4:
children were able to use one-to-one correspondence mappings to reconstruct exact sets through
identity events, but not through substitution events.
In the next experiment, we return to children’s ability to reconstruct exact sets in the absence of
transformations. We ask whether subset-knowers show any ability to track a large number of objects
when one-to-one correspondence cues do not provide useful information.
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one correspondence relations
In Experiment 1, we showed that performance dropped with 11 branches compared to 6 branches,
thus providing evidence that children detect and use the information provided by the one-to-one cor-
respondence between branches and puppets. However, owing to the small sample size, the perfor-
mance of this group alone did not reveal whether subset-knowers are at all able to reconstruct
large exact numbers of objects, when one-to-one correspondence cues are not informative. We thus
administered the 11-branch condition to the participants of Experiment 2 as well, in an effort to in-
crease the sample. Here we present the data pooled for all participants in Experiments 1 and 2.7.1. Method
The 11-branch condition was identical to Experiment 1 (no transformation), except that the sets of
5 or 6 puppets were now placed on a tree with 11 branches, thus making a difference of one puppet
harder to detect. Children received two trials in the 11-branch condition (one with 5 puppets, one with
6 puppets), after completion of the two trials of Experiment 1 or 2. In total, 36 subset-knowers (16
female, mean age 34.08 months, 32:06–35:26) contributed data for both set sizes (5 and 6 puppets):
13 participants from Experiment 1, 13 participants from the puppet addition/subtraction condition in
Experiment 2, and 10 participants from the branch addition/subtraction condition in Experiment 2.7.2. Results and discussion
Fig. 6 presents children’s performance in this experiment. There was no difference between the
subgroups of children who had previously participated in different experiments or conditions
(ps > :24;g2ps < :09 for the main effect and interaction involving Subgroup) so the data were pooled
across these experiments and conditions. Children’s performance was opposite in direction to the cor-
rect pattern: they searched longer in the trial in which no puppet should have remained in the box (5-
puppet trial) than in the trial in which one puppet should have remained (6-puppet trial),
F(1,33) = 4.4, p = .043, g2p ¼ :12. This seemingly counterintuitive result appears to be an effect of the
feedback received on the ﬁrst trial: on the second trial, children tended to align their searches with
this feedback. Hence, children tended to search less after a ﬁrst trial with 5 puppets, in which no fur-
ther search was warranted (3072 ms searching with 5 puppets followed by 887 ms searching with 6
puppets); in contrast, the searching time increased slightly after a ﬁrst trial with 6 puppets, in which
the feedback had shown one puppet to be missing (1467 ms searching with 6 puppets followed by
1874 ms searching with 5 puppets). This pattern resulted in an interaction between Set Size and Trial
Order, F(1,34) = 5.7, p = .023, g2p ¼ :14.11 branches
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0 
1000
3000
5000 ms Box expected empty 
Box expected to contain 
 1 puppet
* p<0.05 
Fig. 6. Searching times for Experiment 5. The tree had 11 branches, 5 or 6 more than there were puppets, thus the branches did
not convey any useful information to track the puppets. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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succeed in tracking large exact numbers of objects when one-to-one correspondence cues are not
informative. However, these data should be interpreted with caution, given that the 11-branch trials
were always presented after children had participated in another experiment on a 6-branch tree, and
also had received a familiarization trial to orient them to attend to the tree.8. General discussion
In the present research, we tested whether children who do not yet possess symbols for large exact
numbers (subset-knowers) are nonetheless able to give judgments pertaining to large exact quanti-
ties. To do so, the children were provided with one-to-one correspondence cues indexing the objects
of a set: cues that made exact numerical differences accessible to perception. In conditions where the
set to be reconstructed was comprised of the same individual items throughout the trial (no transfor-
mation in Experiment 1; the identity-preserving events in Experiment 4), the children were able to
discriminate 5 from 6 puppets. The information conveyed by the one-to-one correspondence cues
proved essential to the children’s success, as their performance dropped when these cues were not
informative (Experiment 5). Our ﬁndings therefore provide evidence that children understand at least
some aspects of Hume’s principle before they acquire symbols for exact numbers: they understand
that one-to-one correspondence provides a measure of a set that is exact and stable in time, even
through displacements and temporary occlusions.
However, as soon as a transformation affecting either the identity of the set to be reconstructed (the
puppets) or the identity of the one-to-one correspondence cues (the branches) was applied (additions
and subtractions in Experiment 2, substitutions in Experiment 4), our participants ceased to perform ex-
act discriminations on large sets. In contrast, Experiment 3 provided evidence that children performed
near ceiling when the same addition and subtraction events were applied to small sets, thus excluding
memory for the transformation itself as the source of the children’s difﬁculty. Furthermore, Experiment
4 presented aminimal contrast between twoevents that each resulted inno change innumber: one event
that did not affect the identity of the individual members of the set (one puppet exiting and re-entering
thebox)andoneevent thatdid (onepuppetexiting theboxandanother, featurally identical puppetenter-
ing thebox). Although the samepuppetmovements occurred through the openingof the box in these two
conditions, children succeeded at reconstructing the sets in the former case and failed in the latter. Inter-
estingly, childrendid not ignore the transformationaltogether, for theydid not expect the end set to stand
in a similar one-to-one relation to the branches of the tree as the starting set. Rather, whenever the iden-
tity of the items in the set of puppets changed, the children appeared to give up on the one-to-one corre-
spondence cues and switched to a generic strategy, searching until they felt the box was empty.
How can this pattern of success and failure be explained, and in particular, why did children succeed
onlywhen the identity of the puppets and the brancheswas preserved? Perhaps their performance sim-
ply reﬂected their understanding of our task: after all, in real life there are situationswhere identity, not
number, is the relevant factor.When gathering your family in your house, for example, it is important to
make sure that your own children are there: replacing themwith the neighbor’s will not do. Despite the
fact that the experimenter was calling the set of puppets a ‘family’, several pieces of evidence indicate
that childrendidnot interpret thegoal of thepresent task as being restricted to the individuals presented
on the tree at the start of the trial. Crucially, when testedwith small sets, they readily placed all puppets
on the tree, evenwhenoneof themwas anewcomer. Furthermore,with large sets they failed to solve the
task following the addition or subtraction of a branch, despite the fact that the family of puppets did not
change in this condition. Thus, the pattern of ﬁndings obtainedwith large sets evidently reﬂects limita-
tions to children’s processing of these sets, rather than their understanding of the task.
Perhaps children’s performance with large sets was constrained by limitations of processing re-
sources, such as limitations in working memory4: the children may have failed to remember all the rel-4 In all the studies, we embedded the transformation events in narratives, in the hope that these narratives would make the
events both more appealing and more memorable to children. However, it is an open question whether the narratives enhanced
children’s interest in or memory for the events.
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with the identity-preserving events and in the absence of any transformation, we know that they could
remember one-to-one relations between branches and puppets and reproduce such a relation at the end
of a trial. Furthermore, because they succeeded at tracking additions and subtractions with small sets, we
know that they could remember and process set transformation events. However, it is possible that the
joint requirements of remembering both a one-to-one mapping and a transformation exceeded the limits
on children’s memory and attention. Alternatively, even if children could remember all the relevant
information, they might have failed to combine these two pieces of information to predict the ﬁnal map-
ping between branches or puppets.
Crucially, our task was designed so that there were strategies available for working around any lim-
itations in children’s processing resources. First, in the substitution events, children could have suc-
ceeded by focusing on the initial state of one-to-one correspondence and discarding the
transformation as having no effect. Children were likely to discover this strategy, however, only if they
understood that a subtraction of one is reversed by an addition of one. Second, in all conditions, chil-
dren could have succeeded by tracking the set of branches that were not paired with a puppet, rather
than the set of puppets itself: Because there was never more than one unpaired branch, this set was
always fully within the range of children’s object-tracking capacities. To succeed with this latter strat-
egy, however, children needed (1) to understand that tracking branches would yield the same infor-
mation as tracking puppets, and (2) to represent transformation events in terms of their impact on the
set of unpaired branches. For example, an addition of one puppet corresponded to one fewer unpaired
branch, a subtraction of one puppet corresponded to one more unpaired branch, and so on. Perhaps,
this mental operation was not available to children, and thus limited their use of strategies based on
tracking branches. Although this difﬁculty may explain children’s failure with transformations involv-
ing puppets (addition/subtraction or substitution), it fails to account for children’s failure at the
branch addition/subtraction condition, where the impact of the events on the set of unpaired branches
was easily identiﬁable. This last ﬁnding thus leads us to favor the alternative explanation, i.e., that
children failed to realize that the task could be solved not only by tracking the puppets, but also by
computing how many branches did not have a matching puppet – a limitation of their understanding
of one-to-one correspondence relations.
Children’s format of representation for one-to-one mappings may have been such that they could
not easily track the set of unpaired branches through transformations. One-to-one correspondence
relations may be represented either via individual pairings (as in ‘‘each branch has a puppet’’) or at
the level of the whole set. In the ﬁrst case, to represent the puppets in relation to the branches, chil-
dren could use their resources for parallel object tracking, with the branches serving as a support to
expand the capacities of this system. A relation with one fewer puppets than branches could be rep-
resented using two slots in memory, one for the generic relation (‘‘each branch has a puppet’’) and one
for the deviant branch. This format of representation, however, should be easy to update following the
addition or subtraction of a branch, which leads us to favor an alternative hypothesis. Instead of rep-
resenting the relation at the level of individuals, children may have encoded the mapping between
branches and puppets as a visual conﬁguration, which, sometimes (e.g., when the identity of the set
was preserved), they tried to reproduce as they were taking the puppets out of the box. In line with
our results, such an ensemble-based representation of the relation between puppets and branches
would not easily enable children to compute the impact of one-item transformations, be they trans-
formations of puppets or of branches. This second possibility thus appears more likely, but further re-
search is needed to distinguish these alternatives.
Whatever the reasons for children’s failures, the present pattern of results indicates that one-to-
one correspondence does not specify exact numerical equivalence for children of this age. Children
know that transformations might affect how sets can be measured by one-to-one correspondence,
but they are unable to predict which transformations do or do not affect this measure. Prior to the
mastery of number words and counting, children thus do not recognize that one-to-one correspon-
dence pairings instantiate all of the properties of the relation of exact numerical equality: more spe-
ciﬁcally, they recognize that one-to-one correspondence pairings are stable as long as the sets remains
identical (the Identity principle) but not how these pairings are affected by additions, subtractions, or
substitutions applied to one set (the Addition/Subtraction and Substitution principles). Our ﬁndings thus
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purely approximate ensembles of objects, and to the thesis that such children represent exact number.
On the one hand, children’s understanding goes beyond approximate equality, because when they
track a set that remains identical, they are sensitive to its exact number of elements. On the other
hand, their understanding does not entail all aspects of the mathematical deﬁnition of exact number.
To acquire a full concept of numerical equality, children may later enrich this initially restricted con-
cept of identity.8.1. Young children’s interpretation of one-to-one correspondence: the importance of transformation events
Our ﬁndings replicate and extend previous reports that young children sometimes use one-to-one
correspondence as a successful strategy for producing or evaluating sets of objects. For example,
subset-knowers can judge whether two sets aligned in visual correspondence are ‘‘the same’’ or not
(Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004). Young children also use one-to-one correspondence spontaneously when
sharing a set among several recipients (Mix, 2002). In Piaget’s experiments, moreover, children use
one-to-one correspondence to construct sets of the same number (Gréco & Morf, 1962; Piaget,
1965). Finally, set-reproduction tasks have been used to assess knowledge of exact quantities in
populations of children and adults without access to exact numerical symbols (Butterworth, Reeve,
Reynolds, & Lloyd, 2008; Everett & Madora, 2012; Flaherty & Senghas, 2011; Frank et al., 2008;
Gordon, 2004; Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey, & Goldin-Meadow, 2011).
However, the use of one-to-one correspondence strategies in set-matching tasks cannot stand as
deﬁnitive evidence for understanding exact equality, for two reasons. First, across different versions
of set-reproduction tasks, marked differences in performance have been observed when the spatial
distribution or the nature of the items to be matched were varied: participants generally showed high
performance when the model and response sets were visually aligned, and much lower performance
when these two sets were presented in different modalities or spatial conﬁgurations, or when one of
the sets was hidden from view as the participants gave their responses (Frank et al., 2008; Gordon,
2004; Spaepen et al., 2011; see Frank et al., 2011, for a reproduction of these patterns of difﬁculty
in a group of US adults under verbal interference). This variability across conditions raises questions
for the interpretation of the results: Should we grant participants understanding that one-to-one cor-
respondence entails exact equality, when they only use one-to-one correspondence for two sets that
are visually aligned? Or should we only draw this conclusion when one-to-one correspondence is used
systematically, for all kinds of displays?
Second, set-reproduction tasks can overestimate people’s understanding of exact equality. If a per-
son lacks the concept of exact numerical equality altogether and aims to construct a set approximately
equal to a target set, using one-to-one correspondence would be a successful strategy to do so: the
resulting set would indeed be approximately equal to the model set (in fact, unbeknownst to the
set-maker it would even be better than approximately equal, if no mistake has been made). In line
with this observation, Gréco & Morf (1962) noted that some young children switch between one-
to-one correspondence and estimation strategies when trying to match the numerosity of an array,
as if they did not understand that these two strategies give results of a different nature. Thus, children
or adults who have not mastered counting may use one-to-one correspondence as a strategy to
achieve an approximate numerical match, without trying to reproduce the numerosity of the target
exactly.
Although set reproduction is not in itself a strong test of one’s concept of number, eliciting judg-
ments on the impact of set transformations on one-to-one correspondence relations, as in our task,
provides more deﬁnitive evidence (see also Izard et al., 2008; Lipton & Spelke, 2006; Spaepen et al.,
2011). By eliciting judgments on one-item transformations, we were able to characterize the proper-
ties children attribute to one-to-one correspondence mappings, and contrast their conception of one-
to-one correspondence with true numerical equality. We found that young children’s interpretation of
one-to-one correspondence encompasses only a subpart of the properties of numerical equality: an
understanding that falls short of possessing a concept of exact number. Further research should
employ the same type of tasks with other populations, in particular populations without symbols
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numerical equality.
8.2. Consequences of our ﬁndings for the debate on children’s interpretation of number words
As we noted in the introduction, past research investigating whether subset-knowers construe
number words as referring to exact quantities has yielded mixed results (Brooks et al., 2012; Condry
& Spelke, 2008; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004). More speciﬁcally, out of the four tasks reported in the lit-
erature, children failed to interpret number words as referring to exact quantities in three cases.
In a ﬁrst task, subset-knowers were presented with two sets of toys, one labeled with a number
word beyond their knowledge range (e.g., ‘‘ﬁve’’), and the other unlabeled. They were then asked to
point to a set designated either by this original number word (‘‘ﬁve’’) or by a different number word
(e.g., ‘‘ten’’). In this task, children correctly pointed to the set the experimenter had labeled when they
heard the same number word, and to the other set when they heard the different number word—as
long as no transformation was performed on either set. Whenever the experimenter applied a trans-
formation to the labeled set (rearrangement, addition, or subtraction) before asking the same ques-
tion, the children responded at chance: they did not consistently apply the original number word to
a set that had been rearranged, and they did not consistently apply a different number word to a
set that had been transformed by addition or subtraction (Brooks et al., 2012; Condry & Spelke,
2008). Thus, in this ﬁrst task, children did not apply number words to exact quantities.
One may object that this ﬁrst task was overly complex, but subset-knowers have been found to
perform as poorly in a seemingly simpler task (Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004; Sarnecka & Wright,
2013). There, children were presented with two sets aligned in one-to-one correspondence, thus high-
lighting any difference between them. Across trials, sets either were exactly equal in number or dif-
fered by one item. The experimenter labeled one of the sets with a number word and asked the
child about the second set, giving a choice between the same and a different number word. Although
children were able to state whether the two sets were the same or not in a pretest question, they did
not use this similarity to choose between the two proposed number words.
In a different task (Brooks et al., 2012; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004), children had to judge whether a
number word continued or ceased to apply to a single set of objects that were placed in an opaque box
and transformed through addition, subtraction, or rearrangement (shaking the box). In contrast to the
above ﬁndings, subset-knowers reliably chose the original number word after the shaking event, and
they chose the alternative number word after the addition or subtraction transformation, this time
behaving as if they interpreted number words as precise.
Finally, in a fourth study, subset-knowers were again tested with a single set of objects that was
labeled with a number word and then transformed. This study differed from the previous one in three
respects: First, instead of adding or subtracting just one object, the number of objects was doubled or
halved; second, this time the sets remained fully visible throughout the transformation; and third,
children were asked whether the original number label, or a different label, now applied to the set,
rather than given a choice between two labels (Condry & Spelke, 2008). This time, children’s perfor-
mance dropped to chance with the addition and subtraction events (although they answered correctly
when no transformation was applied), contrasting with the results of the previous transformation
task.
Several explanations have been proposed for this pattern of results. First, children’s failure at the
last task suggests that keeping the sets visible may have a negative impact on their performance.
When sets are visible, children may be drawn to rely on perception, which is approximate, and thus
to generalize number words beyond exact numerical quantities. However, this explanation seems un-
likely, because (1) Condry and Spelke’s (2008) visible single-set task induced major changes in num-
erosity (doubling and halving), easily detectable by children, and (2) children failed at Sarnecka and
Gelman’s (2004) one-to-one comparison task, where the conditions of presentation highlighted any
difference across sets.
Second, it is possible that tasks involving two sets are simply overwhelming for children, single-set
tasks thus being a better indicator of children’s semantic competence (Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004).
However, Condry and Spelke (2008) showed that children sometimes succeed in two-set tasks, since
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they also showed that participants sometimes failed in single-set tasks.
Third, counter to the previous explanation, Brooks et al. (2012) argued that children succeeded at
Sarnecka and Gelman’s (2004) single-set transformation task without extensive knowledge of the
semantics of the number words. According to their argument, to succeed at the task children only
need to know that a change in quantity is necessary to warrant a change of number word: therefore,
children know to conserve the initial label after a shaking event. For addition and subtraction trans-
formations, however, they ﬁnd the right answer only by applying pragmatic inferences: If a child is
given a choice between a label he/she heard earlier in the trial and a new label, Brooks et al. argue,
given the assumption that the adult asking the question is knowledgeable, the child would infer that
the new label provided is relevant. Pragmatic inferences, in contrast, provide no ground to ﬁnd the
correct answer in Condry and Spelke’s (2008) two-sets task. To support this view, Brooks et al. adapted
Condry and Spelke’s (2008) two-set task and Sarnecka and Gelman’s (2004) single-set transformation
task using novel words and objects, and obtained the same pattern of success and failure across these
two tasks, where children were asked to choose between two labels (as in Sarnecka and Gelman’s sin-
gle-set task) or between two objects (as in Condry and Spelke’s two-sets task).
This last explanation holds promise to explain the whole set of results, with one adjustment: Given
the contrast between children’s reasoning about identity and substitution events in Experiment 4,
children may not think that a change in number words requires a change in quantity but rather a
change of set identity. According to this interpretation, children would be conﬁdent that a number
word continues to apply to a set as long as this set remains composed of all and only the same indi-
viduals. In contrast, just like in the case of addition or subtraction transformations, they would make
no speciﬁc prediction as to whether this number word or another number word applies, if one or more
individual members of the set are replaced by other individuals – unless the pragmatics of the task
leads them to the correct answer.
This explanation in terms of set identity predicts children’s failure at the one-to-one comparison
task, which was left unexplained in Brooks et al.’s (2012) account. Indeed, in both the one-to-one com-
parison task and the single-set transformation task, children must choose between a previously-heard
label and a new label, thus in terms of pragmatics the two tasks are equivalent. In terms of quantities
involved, the two tasks are equivalent too. Therefore, if children reason in terms of quantity, they
should succeed in the comparison task when the two sets are equal in number, just as they succeed
in the single-set task when no transformation is applied. If however children reason in terms of set
identity, then in the one-to-one comparison task there is no reason why information about one set
should help them solve a question about another set. To get a better understanding of this interpre-
tation, think of ﬁrst names, which are deﬁned in terms of identity. If a set is called ‘‘ﬁve’’ and is put
in exact one-to-one correspondence with another set, we predict that children are undecided as to
whether this second set should be called ‘‘ﬁve’’ like the other set. Nevertheless, children should know
that if the members of a set called ‘‘ﬁve’’ remain in the set, and no new item is added, then the set is
still called ‘‘ﬁve’’.5
Interpreting children’s usage of the number words in terms of set identity makes an important pre-
diction. In the published versions of the single-set transformation task (Brooks et al., 2012; Sarnecka &
Gelman, 2004), the transformation leaving numerosity constant left the identity of the set unchanged
as well. Under our interpretation, subset-knowers should not choose to conserve the initial number
word for an identity-changing substitution transformation, even though the cardinal value of the
set remains constant in this condition.5 Set identity fails to account for one of the ﬁndings cited above: the fact that, in Condry and Spelke’s (2008) two-sets task,
children failed to modulate their response when asked to choose a set corresponding to the original vs. a new number word, not
only after addition and subtraction events, but also after mere rearrangements. Instead, in all cases, whether presented with the
original or with a new number word, children tended to pick the set that the experimenter had manipulated. In this task, it is
possible that the rearrangement event, which was executed by the experimenter purposefully (in contrast to the shaking events
that have been employed in other tasks) called children’s attention to the manipulated set or induced the children to consider that
the experimenter’s action ought to be relevant to her question.
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At 5 years of age, children have clearly overcome the limitations of their understanding of numer-
ical equality, since they know how set transformations impact number words, even for number words
that fall beyond their counting range, and even for substitution transformations that keep number
constant while altering the identity of a set’s members (Lipton & Spelke, 2006). Furthermore, this
knowledge is not restricted to the use of numerals, as 5-year-old children also use visual one-to-
one correspondence as a criterion to judge whether two sets are equal or not, and they can predict
the effect of additions and subtractions depending on the starting relation (Cooper, 1984).
How do children progress from an initial understanding of set identity to the adult concept of num-
erosity?Onepossibility is that childrenﬁrst understand the principles of exact numerical equality as ap-
plied to small sets, through their object-tracking system, and later extend those principles to large sets
(Klahr &Wallace, 1973). As far as understanding the impact of addition and subtraction transformations
onnumerical equality, this seems a likely possibility, given children’s ability to predict thenumerosity of
small sets through addition and subtraction events. However, it remains to be shown that young chil-
dren are able to handle substitution eventswith small numbers, since substitutions are necessarilymore
complex: they are formed of at least two simple events, one addition and one subtraction.
Alternatively, experience with numeric symbols may play a crucial role in the acquisition of exact
numerical equality. As children become CP-knowers, they assign a meaning to number words that is
deﬁned in terms of the counting procedure. Although the impact of the transition to the CP-knower
stage on children’s concepts of number is debated (Davidson et al., 2012; Le Corre et al., 2006), all par-
ties agree that, at a minimum, CP-knowers appreciate that to say that there are ‘ﬁve frogs’ means that
if they count this set of frogs, they will end the count with the word ‘ﬁve’. Thus, CP-knowers have ac-
cess to a representation that has the properties of exact numbers, and in particular, implies a relation
of exact numerical equality between sets. As a result, whenever they are able to apply counting, or
perhaps even when they can simulate the application of counting, CP-knowers gain the ability to re-
spond in accordance with a precise interpretation of number words. For example, contrary to subset-
knowers, CP-knowers generalize number words correctly in face of two sets presented in visual one-
to-one correspondence (Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004; Sarnecka & Wright, 2013), perhaps because this
conﬁguration enables them to predict how the results of counts would compare across these two sets.
In other tasks where counting is not permitted, young CP-knowers sometimes revert to the same
errors as subset-knowers (Davidson et al., 2012; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008). Nevertheless, it is possible
that, after the children have become CP-knowers, the counting procedure serves to scaffold the devel-
opment of a concept of exact numerical equality between sets by providing children with a mental
model from which they derive the properties of exact numbers. In line with this proposal, words seem
to have a special status with respect to one-to-one correspondence relations for children, as preschool-
ers rely on one-to-one correspondence much earlier when it entails a correspondence between words
and some objects, thanwhen two different sets of objects are put in correspondencewith respect to one
another (Gréco &Morf, 1962; Muldoon, Lewis, & Freeman, 2009). A similar observation was made with
a group of adult homesigners from Nicaragua (Spaepen et al., 2011): In a series of set-reproduction
tasks, homesigners used one-to-one correspondence strategies only rarely, and when they did so, they
used it by mapping their ﬁngers (the constituents of their number signs) to objects, never by mapping
two sets directly onto each other, a seemingly simpler strategy. Understanding how words (or, in the
case of homesigners, ﬁngers) stand in one-to-one correspondence with objects while counting may be
the ﬁrst step that leads to amore general understanding of one-to-one correspondence relations, and in
particular of how one-to-one correspondence warrants exact numerical equality.9. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings shed light both on the extent and the limits of children’s numerical knowledge, before
they master the meanings of all the number words they use in counting. Children who have not mas-
tered the exact numerical meanings of ‘‘ﬁve’’ and ‘‘six’’ are able to use one-to-one correspondence cues
to reconstruct a set of exactly ﬁve or six objects, even when the sets are moved around, rearranged in
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back to the set, as long as the identity of the items forming the sets is not modiﬁed. However, children
do not know how set transformations that change the individual members affect the way sets can be
measured by one-to-one correspondence. Hence, before children acquire symbols for exact number,
one-to-one correspondence deﬁnes a relation of identity between sets: a relation that is not limited
to approximate numerical equality but falls short of exact numerical equality. Furthermore, children
do not understand how one-to-one mappings interact with the addition of one, i.e. the successor func-
tion. At 3 years of age, the child’s state of knowledge for number thus corresponds to the initial stage
of Russell–Frege’s formal deﬁnition of cardinal integers: they have a relation of set identity, but yet
have not ﬁgured out how this notion interacts with basic operations, and how the numbers can be or-
dered in a list structured by a successor function.
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